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Abstract 
Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have become more common and affordable 
for government, commercial, and private use. There are several counter sUAS products 
that employ electromagnetic counter measures to disrupt the communications link of 
sUAS. However, most of these solutions are limited in efficacy to specific sUAS types 
due to the sophisticated control and communications link technologies utilized by sUAS 
which make it challenging to effectively jam. To address these challenges, a Drone 
Detection and Mitigation Radar (DDMR) concept was developed. The jamming 
component of the DDMR used wideband noise combined with random sweeping of the 
noise to jam the communications link. This thesis research was predicated by a laboratory 
experiment which used the DDMR system to successfully jam an sUAS’s 
communications link. This particular experiment did not (1) provide any theoretical 
analysis, (2) simulation analysis to determine the effective jamming probabilities, or (3) 
conduct additional experiments to find the optimal sweeping frequency for the jamming 
component of the DDMR. This thesis focuses on the optimization of the sweeping noise 
jamming solution of the communications link by examining the theoretical and simulation 
analysis as well as the results of further experimental studies. The findings are presented 
in this thesis paper.
1 
Chapter 1: Background 
1.1 Overview of sUAS 
The increasing affordability of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), also known 
as drones, has resulted in significant interest from individuals and businesses. The sUAS 
offers distinct advantages, such as reducing hazardous risks to individuals or performing 
specific functions which might otherwise be impossible to complete. For example, a 
drone can be placed in a radioactive environment and provide immediate feedback 
without jeopardizing an individual’s safety. A sUAS, or drone, can also be considered a 
threat or nuisance when it is not operated in a responsible manner. The rapid increase in 
drone sales could be problematic for many commercial, private, military and government 
entities. Figure 1 shows how the consumer drone market has grown significantly over the 
past several years. 
 
Figure 1. Drone Sales in the U.S. [1] 
2 
Some sUAS will pose a security threat for critical infrastructures and venues, such as 
sports stadiums, military facilities, and airports. Military personnel and law enforcement 
are faced with the difficult task of protecting infrastructure and venues from any security 
threats. There are significant challenges encountered when attempting to protect each of 
these venues. The challenges are not just technological, they are also legal. Military 
installations abroad are not always subject to the same laws as military bases physically 
located in the United States. Currently, within the U.S. the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and various federal 
statutes prohibit any jamming, or electronic counter measures (ECM), that could 
otherwise take place outside the United States. These federal agencies recognize the 
increasing threats created by drone proliferation and are attempting to create new rules 
and regulations to allow the military and law enforcement to employ ECM to protect 
critical infrastructures and susceptible venues from drone threats without violating federal 
laws. 
1.2 Applicable Laws that Prohibit ECM (Radar Jamming) in the U.S 
The FAA is the governing body that is ultimately responsible for the management of 
the National Airspace System (NAS) and civilian aircraft operations under Title 49 
United States Code (U.S.C.) § 40103, sovereignty and use of airspace [2]. Additionally, 
sUAS are defined within Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) 1.1, which 
states “unmanned aircraft mean an aircraft operated without the possibility of direct 
human intervention from within or on the aircraft. [3]” In June 2014, the FAA published 
additional guidance for hobby or recreational use of sUAS. The guidance states the FAA, 
consistent with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, has the authority to 
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undertake enforcement actions against any violators who endanger the safety of the NAS 
[4]. 
The FCC is the governing agency responsible for the management of communications 
within the United States. This responsibility involves ensuring the integrity of radio 
frequency (RC) communications, to include those communications used by sUAS. The 
FCC prohibits the act of jamming or intentionally interfering with any communication 
signals because it is considered a potential public safety risk. The FCC does not want a 
situation where an individual attempts to seek emergency assistance but is unable to do 
so because their communications were jammed. The FCC has implemented the following 
rules concerning the jamming of communications: 
• “Title 47 C.F.R. § 2.803 – prohibits the manufacture, importation, marketing, sale 
or operation of these devices within the United States. 
• Title 47 C.F.R. § 2.807 –  provides for certain limited exceptions, such as the sale 
to the U.S. government. 
• Title 47 U.S.C. § 301 – requires persons operating or using radio transmitters to 
be licensed or authorized under the Commission’s rules. 
• Title 47 U.S.C. § 302(b) – prohibits the manufacture, importation, marketing, sale 
or operation of these devices within the United States. 
• Title 47 U.S.C. § 333 – prohibits willful or malicious interference with the radio 
communications of any station licensed or authorized under the Act or operated 
by the U.S. Government.  
• Title 47 U.S.C. § 503 – allows the FCC to impose forfeitures for willful or 
repeated violations of the Communications Act, the Commission's rules, 
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regulations, or related orders, as well as for violations of the terms and conditions 
of any license, certificate, or other Commission authorization, among other things. 
• Title 47 U.S.C. § 510 – allows for seizure of unlawful equipment. [5]” 
In addition to the policies and procedures enacted by the FAA and FCC, the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ) also prohibits the active jamming or the use of ECM 
within the United States. The FAA and FCC can levy fines and seize drones, but the DOJ 
can criminally prosecute persons who are charged with violating the following federal 
laws: 
• “Title 18 U.S.C. § 1362 – prohibits willful or malicious interference to US 
government communications; subjects the operator to possible fines, 
imprisonment, or both. 
• Title 18 U.S.C. § 1367(a) – prohibits intentional or malicious interference to 
satellite communications; subjects the operator to possible fines, imprisonment, 
or both. [5]” 
Currently, due to the aforementioned regulations and laws, domestic law enforcement 
agencies can only passively monitor drones through radar technology. The radar 
technology will alert law enforcement to an unauthorized drone in its area of 
responsibility. There is a possibility that law enforcement may be exempt from these laws 
in the future and therefore be allowed to utilize jamming technology to ensure particular 
venues and critical infrastructures can be secured against any drone threats. 
1.3 Current Drone Threat Problems 
There are several civilian counter-drone products available which use radar and ECM 
technology. These counter-drone solutions are limited by both the particular type of 
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detection techniques used as well as the ECM deployed. The present solutions are 
therefore usually restricted to specific drone types. The communications technologies 
used in RC drones have become more sophisticated in the last few decades, making sUAS 
more difficult to detect and decode. The sophisticated communication signals can create 
challenges when attempting to deploy effective counter measures against sUAS. The 
research, simulations, and experiments associated with this thesis are focused on mass 
marketed, commercial drones (e.g. DJI Phantom as shown in Figure 2). The majority of 
commercial drones operate on the 2.4GHz to 2.5GHz frequency range. 
 
Figure 2. Common Commercial Drone Manufactured by DJI Innovations 
Some drone enthusiasts operate drones on frequency bands dedicated to other 
technologies. Furthermore, with improved accuracy in global positioning systems (GPS), 
some individuals are foregoing traditional radio frequency (RF) technology and operating 
their drones via GPS. A flexible and robust tracking and jamming system will be 
necessary to effectively neutralize these evolving technologies. 
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Since 2014, there have been hundreds of events where drones interfered with 
restricted airport airspace. These are instances where the drone enthusiast unintentionally 
flew too close to airplanes and caused a public safety risk. The FAA monitors these events 
and publishes the results within the UAS Sightings Report [6]. As commercial drones 
become more affordable and popular, it is highly likely these incidents will continue to 
increase in frequency. 
1.4. Proposed Solution 
The Drone Detection and Mitigation Radar (DDMR) system [7] was designed to 
detect drones and, simultaneously, deploy ECM technology in order to adversely affect a 
drone’s flight. DDMR has several distinct advantages when compared to existing radar 
jamming technologies on the market: 
• DDMR is a low-cost and portable jamming system (small size, weight, and 
power) operating on the 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, ISM (industrial, scientific, and 
medical) band frequencies. 
• The system can be mounted on an assault rifle style platform for quick and easy 
deployment. As such, this system will be very familiar to military and law 
enforcement users who currently utilize this type of weapon platform. 
• DDMR can be used to analyze the RC communications signal for the majority of 
drone products on the market. DDMR is capable of generating optimal 
transmitting waveforms based on analyzing these common frequencies. 
• DDMR transmits multi-functional waveforms that perform both drone jamming 
and radar localization. 
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• Through polarimetric radar signature and Doppler features, DDMR can 
discriminate drones from other objects in the same airspace. 
It is important to understand that each entity, commercial, private, military and 
government, will have a different objective related to the implementation of DDMR 
technology. Under current law, only the federal government, in a very limited capacity, 
would be allowed to employ the use of the DDMR system. If the government decided to 
make changes to current regulations and laws, law enforcement agencies might be 
allowed to protect particular venues and facilities. For example, local law enforcement 
constantly faces threats from drones that drop contraband over prison walls. As another 
example, in the past year, there have been several instances where pilots flew commercial 
drones over NFL stadiums [6]. Even though this activity is prohibited under current law, 
law enforcement could not take any actions against the pilots until after the incidents 
occurred.  In the latter example, the pilots were merely a nuisance, but the situations could 
have been much worse if the pilots had intended to cause harm to civilians at the venues. 
Most law enforcement agencies use passive radar systems to secure critical infrastructures 
or at high-profile venues (targets). An example of a high-profile venue is the Super Bowl, 
the World Series, or a Presidential movement. 
The military does not have any restrictions on active jamming outside the continental 
United States. The military is more concerned about a potential security threat from a 
drone. There have been instances where drones have dropped improvised explosive 
devices on military personnel overseas (Non-U.S.). A military installation could benefit 
from DDMR, and military personnel would likely find its small form factor, light weight, 
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and portability advantageous. Having an effective and reliable DDMR system on a 
military base’s perimeter would help protect the base against adversarial threats. 
The front end of the DDMR will utilize polarimetric radar signature and Doppler 
features in order to identify and discriminate drones from other objects, such as birds. 
However, this separate and distinct section of the system is outside the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis will focus solely on the jamming mitigation part of the DDMR system [7].  
The following diagram demonstrates the fundamental concepts and components of the 
mitigation section of the DDMR system: 
 
[Microcontroller] à [Direct Digital Synthesizer] à [Op Amp] à [Voltage 
Controlled Oscillator] à [Directional Antenna] à [Drone Jamming] 
 
 
Figure 3. General Concept of the Mitigation Section of the DDMR System 
 
1.5 Thesis Statement 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the optimal jamming sweeping frequency 
for the 2.4GHz to 2.5Ghz frequency band, also known as the ISM Band, while 
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maintaining a sufficient power level at each frequency within this frequency bandwidth 
in order to effectively disrupt the communications link with the majority of commercial 
drones operating on this carrier frequency. This thesis includes an analysis of the optimal 
sweeping frequency’s power spectrum, simulation, and experimentation of the sweeping 
jamming frequency. This thesis considers an optimal sweeping jamming frequency as one 
that has the highest hit rate and requires the least amount of power for the jamming system 
to operate effectively. The thesis requires the design and implementation of an electronics 
circuit that created a variable voltage offset and sinusoidal waveform function generator 
















Chapter 2: Control and Communication Links of sUAS 
2.1 Spread Spectrum Systems 
There are two common types of communications signals used to secure the 
communications links of a drone or sUAS – direct sequence spread spectrum and 
frequency hopping spread spectrum. Spreading the communications signal over the 
spread spectrum offers several distinct advantages as compared to the communicating 
over fixed frequencies. 
 
Figure 4. Basic Block Diagram of the Digital Spread Spectrum [10] 
First, spread spectrum signals are much more resistant to interference and jamming. 
Second, the spread spectrum signals can be very difficult to intercept. The spread 
spectrum affords the ability to share a wider bandwidth without sacrificing interference 
of the signal. These are a few reasons why the military has implemented spread spectrum 
techniques since World War II and also why, within the last few decades, it is more 
commonplace in the civilian marketplace. 
2.2 Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum 
Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) is a type of spread spectrum modulation 
developed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in response to ECM technology. 
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Initially, DSSS was limited to military applications before being adopted into the 
commercial domain. DSSS spreads the digital signal across a broad bandwidth and 
occupies the entire bandwidth simultaneously as the signal is hopping across various 
frequencies within the bandwidth [10] (See Figure 4). This allows the DSSS signal to 
operate efficiently at higher data rates with a lower signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio compared 
to the Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS). DSSS technology allows the user 
of an sUAS to communicate securely with a low probability the signal will be interfered 
or jammed by an ECM. 
 
Figure 5. General DSSS Process [13] 
DSSS signal is modulated through a redundant bit sequence known as pseudorandom 
noise, or PN code. The transmitters and receivers of the communications signal know the 
sequence of the PN code [14]. The PN code is independent of the data in the 
communications signal. The PN code allows the signal to be spread through a much wider 
bandwidth. This spread spectrum technique will make interfering with or jamming the 
signal more challenging because it uses a wider bandwidth. Since the receiver knows the 
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PN code, or spreading code, it will be removed in order to reconstitute the 
communications signal to its original form [14]. 
2.3 DSSS General Parameters 
Each DSSS channel is 22 MHz wide in bandwidth and is separated by at least 5 MHz 
from any other channel. This means there are only three unique, non-overlapping bands 
within the 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz ISM band [15]. If the bands are non-overlapping, there is 
3 MHz bandwidth between each band. Dwell time is not a concern with DSSS 
communications, as the basic principle with this spread spectrum technique requires a 
shift of phase rather than a shift of frequency [16]. Two common DSSS phase shift keying 
modulation techniques include binary phase shift keying (BPSK) and differential phase-
shift keying (DPSK). 
 
Figure 6. DSSS Channel Concept [15] 
2.4 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
The other commonly used anti-jamming technique is achieved through frequency 
hopping spread spectrum (FHSS). Similar to the DSSS, the transmitter and receiver must 
have some predetermined knowledge of the communications signal in order for the link 
to be successful. In the FHSS case, the transmitter and receiver know the frequency 
hopping sequence. This technique requires the signal to rapidly change frequencies at 
higher energy levels and narrower bandwidth as compared to the DSSS. The dwell time 
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is how long the signal is present at a particular frequency. The hop time is the length of 
time it takes to change frequencies. Both the dwell time and hop time must be considered 
when utilizing this anti-jamming technique. 
 
Figure 7. General FHSS Channel Concept [17] 
2.5 FHSS General Parameters 
Within the ISM band, which is approximately from 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, there are at 
least 75 channels, or carrier frequencies, and each channel is typically 1 MHz to 2 MHz 
wide. According to the FCC, the minimum bandwidth between channels on the ISM band 
is 25 kHz [18]. However, it is common practice for an sUAS to have a larger hop between 
its carrier frequencies of approximately 6 MHz to 10 MHz to allow the communications 
signal to utilize more of the bandwidth available in the ISM band. Unlike the DSSS 
signals, a FHSS signal does not use overlapping channels per the FCC § 15.247 [18]. 
Furthermore, the FCC has limited the maximum dwell time for any frequencies on a 
channel to 400 ms [18]. Most commercial drones that use FHSS communications have a 
dwell time of 100 ms to 200 ms. 
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Chapter 3: General Analysis of Frequency Sweeping Jamming and Its 
Effectiveness 
3.1 Probability of Intercept 
A critical component of jamming a drone requires the ability to effectively intercept 
its communications link. Low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) radar was developed to 
intentionally make detection and interference difficult through DSSS and FHSS 
techniques. Typically, there are four kinds of intercept for consideration: spatial domain, 
frequency domain, time domain, and others [19, 20]. This thesis and the proposed DDMR 
solution focused on the time domain, for which the minimum intercept duration time is 
needed to disrupt the communications link of a drone. Within the FHSS context, this 
means the number of “hits” or the coincidences when the jamming frequency overlaps 
the communication frequency. If the jamming spectrum “hits” on the communications 
spectrum with enough energy and incidents, the jamming frequency will interrupt the 
communications link between the transmitter and drone. There are a few hypothesized 
methods on how best to calculate an effective hit rate, or probability of intercept (POI), 
through computer simulations and experimentation. 
3.2 Self and Smith Model 
The most common method to find the POI is a model developed by A.G. Self and 
B.G. Smith, Intercept Time and Its Prediction [21]. Self and Smith continued and 
improved upon the original theory from B.R. Hatcher’s Probability of Intercept and 
Intercept Time [22]. The Self and Smith method is often found in textbooks and articles 
that discuss electronic warfare, and it is considered the standard for finding the POI for 
ECM technology. The Self and Smith [19, 21] method analyzed the communications 
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frequency and the jamming frequency as two independent window functions, and it 
identified the overlapping coincidences within the respective pulse trains. The method is 
versatile and applicable in situations where there are three or more windows functions, 
also referred to as pulse trains. 
 
Figure 8. Basic Windows Functions: “a” is pulse train i, “b” is pulse train j, “c” is 
pulse train k, “d” is pulse train of overlaps [19] 
 












The mean period between M window functions of pulse train overlaps is T0, and the 
mean window period is Tj. For M = 1, 2, and 3, this equation becomes the following 
explicit form: 
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 M = 1 𝑇" = 	𝑇, (2) 






 M = 3 
𝑇" = 	
(𝑇,𝑇1𝑇3)
(𝜏, 	+	𝜏1 	+ 	𝜏3)
 
(4) 
where T1, T2, and T3 are the periods for each of the window functions whereas t1, t2, and 












which, for M = 1, 2, and 3, becomes 
 M = 1 𝜏" = 	 𝜏, (6) 














For the probability of at least one intercept in time, T, is 
 P(T) = 1 - K𝑒6(7/79), where K = 1 – P0  (9) 











Declaration of an adequate intercept may require at least m pulses. Thus, if the pulse 
rate interval (PRI) of the received signal is T2, then 
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3.3 Other Probability of Intercept Analysis Methods 
A new methodology, developed by Harri Saarnisaari, is described in the 2016 article 
Jamming Hit Rate Analysis for Frequency Agile Communications [20]. Saarnisaari’s 
method expanded upon Self and Smith’s method and proposed a new analysis to more 
accurately calculate the hit rate. Saarrnisaari recognized the Self and Smith model 
underestimated the hit rate, particularly when there are spectral mismatches. A spectral 
mismatch occurs when one signal pulse is much larger than another. If a short jamming 
pulse is used to sweep quickly across the communications signal, it may hit on the 
communications signal several times due to the much longer dwell time of the hopping 
frequency. The original model compared these two signal pulses and calculated a single 
hit when, in reality, there could have been multiple hits to the communications signal. 
Saarnisaari [20] agreed with Self and Smith’s [21] original theory for the average hit 
duration: 






where tb is the duration of the frequency hopping communications signal and tj is the 
duration of the jamming signal. The average interval between hits is: 
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where Tb is the average interval length of the repeatable communications signal and Tj is 
the period of the jamming signal. Furthermore, in a frequency hopping scenario, the 
average interval length between transmissions is: 
 TK 	= 	𝑁K𝑡K,		where 𝑁K is the number of different frequencies (15) 
 
Figure 9. Jamming Analysis Based on Saarnisaari’s Methodology [20] 
One of the critical components to Saarnisaari’s [20] solution was calculating the 
spectral matching, SM, parameters using the following: 




where WJ is the total bandwidth of the jamming signal and WS is the total bandwidth of 
the communications signal. 
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When considering a spectral mismatch with a short jamming signal, the burst hit rate 
from the jamming signal is: 




and there is a fraction of the communication signal that hits with the jamming burst: 




Where M is the number of hits the jamming signal has during the communications 
signal interval: 




With Î and PI known, a new hit rate, r, can be calculated with the following equation: 
 ρ	 = 	 𝑆*e𝑃Y (20) 
Comparing the two methods can yield significantly different hit rates. For the Self 
and Smith model [21], which analyzed the hit rate at fast sweeping frequencies, it is 
intuitive that the number of hopping frequencies limit the hit rate. From the Self and 
Smith model [21], the hit rate is found from: 




where the average hit duration, t0, is divided by the average interval between hits, T0. 












For example, if there are 10 hopping channels, where Nb = 10, and assuming tj << tb, 
Tb = Nbtb = 10tb and t0 = 1. In this case where tj = Tj, rmax = 0.10 or 10%. The hit rate, r, 
will be reduced at a linear rate to zero as the duty cycle ratio between tj and Tj are reduced 
from 100 percent to zero. For instance, if there were 8 hopping channels this would yield 
a hit rate of rmax = 0.125, or 12.5%. This model provided an upper bound limit based on 
the number of hopping channels utilized by the drone’s communications link. The hit 
rate’s upper bound limit will be reduced by the same factor as the number of hopping 
channels in the system. 
The Self and Smith model [21] is limited when there are large discrepancies between 
the duration of the coincidental overlapping signals. In most cases, the model will 
underestimate the hit rates when there is a large spectral mismatch. The spectral mismatch 
creates an increase to the burst hit period that results in a lower burst hit rate. Saarnisaari’s 
method [20] addressed the limitations of the Self and Smith model [21]. 
Contrasting Saarnisaari’s methodology with the same fast sweeping frequencies 
considered within this thesis, the spectral matching coefficient, SM, would be 1 because 
the jamming bandwidth exceeds the communications bandwidth. The burst hit rate, PI, 
will be 1 because the average interval length between repeating communication 
transmissions, Tb, will be much greater than average interval between hits, T0. Also, Tb 
and tb will remain the same for the purposes of this example. Therefore, it is only 
necessary to find e for the hit rate. The distinct difference between the two methodologies 
was that Saarnisaari considered the number of hits the jamming signal has during the 
communications signal interval. This produced a higher upper bound limit when 
compared to Self and Smith. Using the same parameters studied for Self and Smith [21], 
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the hit rate using Saarnisaari’s method [20] is rmax = SMePI. Again, this was due to the 
fast sweeping frequencies and can be observed below where tj << tb. 
 
Figure 10. General Jamming Analysis with Fast Sweeping Jamming 
Figure 10 is an example of the burst communications frequency (represented in 
orange) and the sweeping jamming frequency (represented in blue). The average hit 
duration, t0, is the sum of all Dt’s divided by the length of the hopping frequency, tb. This 
is a better visual representation of the hit rate with fast sweeping jamming frequencies. 
Neither Self and Smith or Saarnisaari provide a method for finding an optimal 
sweeping frequency, because they simply provide boundary limits as the hit rates 
remained constant. Saarnisaari stated “if the communication signal duration is much 
larger than the duration of the jamming signals, then t0 = tj. Therefore, min {tb, tj} is the 
upper bound for the sole hit duration…” [20] Since t0 = tj, the revised hit rate is a ratio of 
tj/Tj. This is true with the large spectral mismatch because T0 = Tj as long as tj << tb. In 
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other words, if tj = 0.1Tj, then the hit rate will be approximately 10%. Or if tj = 0.5Tj, then 
the hit rate will increase to 50%.  
3.4 Hit Rate Simulation 
A MATLAB simulation was developed in an attempt to follow Saarnisaari’s 
methodology. The communications signal simulated in MATLAB used 8 channels to be 
consistent with most commercial sUAS, such as the DJI Phantom drones. Some cheaper 
and less sophisticated drone use fewer channels for their communications links. 
The MATLAB simulation jamming frequency utilized a sinusoidal evolution pattern. 
From previous research and experimentation1, this waveform is considered a robust and 
effective modulation pattern to jam a drone communications signal link. A sweeping 
sinusoidal waveform at high frequency rates will ultimately jam any communications 
signals, but this process can have unintended consequences by adversely affecting other 
communications signals. Furthermore, faster sweeping frequencies require more power 
to operate the components of the DDMR system [7] or any jamming system. The primary 
objective of creating a MATLAB simulation was to help validate the optimal sweeping 
jamming frequency. 
To mitigate any anomalies of the random set of 8 channels from MATLAB’s random 
number generator, the simulation had a large sample size of 125,000. In other words, an 
array was created using the randperm function in MATLAB to generate 8 random 
numbers equivalent to frequencies contained within the ISM frequency band. These 8 
values were placed in an array in a pattern which repeated 125,000 times, similar to how 
                                               
1 In the summer of 2016, the Advanced Radar Research Center at the University of Oklahoma and the Air 
Force Research Lab from Tinker Air Force Base built and tested an initial prototype DDMR system. These 
results verified the DDMR system functioned effectively and jammed the communications signal link 
between the controller and receiver of a commercial drone. 
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the FHSS works with drones when a known frequency hopping pattern between a drone’s 
transmitter and receiver for 8 channels is repeated continuously. 
 
Figure 11. Example of First 8 Channels for FHSS Drone Communications Link 
Simulation Array with a Dwell Time of 100 Milliseconds 
 
The jamming frequency utilized the sin function in MATLAB. An array for the 
sweeping frequency was created between 100 kHz and 1 MHz. This array was the 
jamming frequency, and the hit rate can be found from the difference (absolute value) 
between the jamming frequency and the drone’s array table. The following two charts 
illustrated the hit rates at 100 kHz and 1MHz sweeping frequencies: 
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Hits were counted anywhere the drone array and the jamming array overlapped within 
a 3 MHz2 bandwidth. This ensured any hits on the 1 MHz bandwidth drone array, a typical 
frequency hopping bandwidth for each communications channel utilizing FHSS in 
commercial drones, were counted as the jamming frequency swept across the drone’s 
frequency band. The total hit rate was found by adding the total number of hits divided 
by the length of the drone’s non-repeating array table. The simulations can be easily 
replicated for different bandwidths, sweeping frequencies, and step sizes as appropriate. 
 
Figure 14. Drone Frequency Hopping Versus 100 kHz Jamming Sweeping 
Frequency 
 
 The jamming sweeping frequency in Figure 14 is sweeping at such a fast rate it 
appears on the plot as a solid blue background, and the drone channels are represented 
                                               
2 Oscilloscope measurements of the VCO from the DDMR prototype demonstrated a 3 dB bandwidth half 
power point estimated at approximately 5 MHz. Therefore, a 3 MHz boundary window was selected as a 
reasonable and conservative approach to evaluate hit rate performance with the simulation and 
experiments set forth in this thesis. 
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in orange. A much closer view, shown in Figure 15, is needed to observe the sweeping 
simulated by the MATLAB code. 
 
Figure 15. A Close-Up View of Drone Frequency Hopping Versus 100 kHz 
Jamming Sweeping Frequency 
 
The following chart demonstrates the hit rates at various frequencies between 100 
kHz and 1 MHz. 
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Figure 16. Hit Rate Simulation 
The simulations demonstrated a sinusoidal sweeping frequency at 100 kHz had the 
lowest hit rate of approximately 2.5 percent. This was less than both hit rates suggested 
by Self and Smith [21] and Saarnisaari’s [20] methods. The simulation showed the hit 
rate increased as the sweeping frequencies increased, peaking at 900 kHz with a hit rate 
of approximately 11.25 percent. The hit rate decreased to approximately 10.3 percent at 
a sweeping frequency of 1 MHz. All of these hit rates were less than the upper bound 
limits calculated using both the Self and Smith and Saarnisaari methodologies. 
According to the MATLAB simulations, a sweeping frequency approaching 900 kHz 
reached the point of diminished return, meaning the hit rate no longer increased. 
However, this might not be the optimal sweeping frequency. A lower sweeping frequency 
with a lower hit rate might be sufficient to effectively disrupt any communications signals 
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within the 2.4 GHz frequency band. The higher sweeping frequencies will be more 
effective but require additional power. Two of the primary concerns in designing the 
DDMR system were size and weight. Given these considerations, a lower sweeping 
frequency may afford the system a smaller power source, which would help achieve the 
overall goal of the system. 
3.5 Initial Experiments with Changing Sweeping Frequencies 
An experiment to evaluate the optimal jamming sweeping frequency was performed 
using the Spektrum DX7S (RC drone) transmitting controller and the prototype DDMR 
(jammer). It was unknown how many frequency hopping channels this controller used or 
how long the burst communications signals lasted. Over 150 samples were collected with 
a digitizing oscilloscope and analyzed with MATLAB in an attempt to determine its 
hopping frequencies. This controller was estimated to use 22 channels to achieve its 
frequency hopping spread spectrum. While this controller differs slightly from the DJI 
Phantom controller, specifically regarding the number of frequency hopping channels, 
the underlying concept of jamming the transmitting communications link remained the 
same. 
The output waveforms from the jammer were also collected with an oscilloscope, 
using the same sampling rate and time period as the Spektrum’s controller. The 
Spektrum’s samples at each of the 22 hopping frequencies were imported into MATLAB 
and processed at 10 of the jammer’s distinct sweeping frequencies between 100 kHz and 
1 MHz. The purpose of analyzing each of the 22 hopping frequencies was to maintain an 
average weighted hit rate in order to best compare the final hit rates at different sweeping 
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jamming frequencies. Otherwise, certain hopping frequencies would have been 
oversampled, resulting in a skewed final hit rate. 
 
Figure 17. Oscilloscope Data Collection from the RC Drone Transmitter and the 
DDMR 
 
There is one caveat regarding data collection from the oscilloscope, specifically the 
memory was limited within the hardware of the oscilloscope. This restricted the amount 
of data collected from the RC drone’s transmitter and jammer’s output signal. A sample 
period of 10 µs was the largest sample time period that could be collected with a sampling 
rate of 20 Giga samples per second (GSa/s). This does not affect the methodology for 
calculating or comparing hit rates. As previously stated, commercial drones typically 
have a dwell time of approximately 100 ms. The data collected can be extrapolated from 
10 µs to 100 ms and the hit rate will remain unaffected since the drone’s frequency would 
not have had sufficient time to hop to the next channel in its hopping sequence. 
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One of the initial observations from the data processing of the jammer’s signal was 
the presence of harmonic waveforms. It appeared there were harmonics at every 2.5 GHz 
band. The bandwidth of the VCO jamming signal also increased 100 MHz at each 
respective harmonic. For instance, the VCO signal had a bandwidth of approximately 100 
MHz at the 2.4 GHz band, and the signal was approximately 200 MHz at the 4.8 GHz 
band.  
 
Figure 18. MATLAB Plot of Harmonics with the DDMR VCO Output 
The presence of harmonics was confirmed when the jammer’s output signal was 
collected with a spectrum analyzer. Figure 18 from the spectrum analyzer showed 
harmonics at 2.4 GHz, 4.8 GHz, and 7.2 GHz bands. 
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Figure 19. Spectrum Analyzer of DDMR VCO 
It was important to eliminate these output frequency signals from the VCO, otherwise 
there would have been additional undesired frequencies outside the ISM band jammed 
with the DDMR. A low pass filter and band pass filter were added to the output of the 
DDMR’s VCO to eliminate its harmonic frequencies and to ensure noise is emitted only 
within the ISM band. 
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Figure 20. A Low Pass and Band Pass Filter on the DDMR VCO 
Following the implementation of the hardware filters, the output signals from the 
jammer was again collected with an oscilloscope. The following power spectral density 




Figure 21. RC Drone Transmitter Signal (Blue) and DDMR VCO Signal Power 
(Red) Spectral Density MATLAB Plot 
 
Figure 21 shows the 1 MHz sinusoidal wave sweeping frequency covering the ISM 
band through the DDMR system’s VCO. However, in order to accurately calculate the 
hit rate between the two signals, the time domain must also be considered. MATLAB’s 
spectrogram function plotted the RC drone’s transmitter signal and jammer’s signal with 
a time sample time period of 10 µs. The following plot contains the same two signals 
from the power spectral density plot in Figure 20: 
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Figure 22. Spectogram MATLAB Plot of the VCO at 1 MHz Sweeping Frequency 
It is easy to identify the points of intersection in Figure 22, as these are areas where 
there are “hits” between the jammer and drone. The duration of these pulse train overlaps 
were counted and then divided by the entire length (time) of the hopping frequency to 
determine the hit rate. The following 3D plots further demonstrate the points of 




Figure 23. 3D MATLAB Plot of Drone Transmitter (Blue) and VCO (Red) with 1 
MHz Sweeping Frequency 
 
 
Figure 24. 3D MATLAB Plot of Drone Transmitter (Blue) and VCO (Red) with 
500 kHz Sweeping Frequency 
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Figure 25. 3D MATLAB Plot of Drone Transmitter (Blue) and VCO (Red) with 
100 kHz Sweeping Frequency 
 
In Figures 23 through 25, the probability of intercept (POI) remained relatively 
constant. The POI was calculated from the Spektrum’s 22 hopping channels at each of 10 
sweeping frequencies. These results were very close to what Self and Smith proposed in 
Chapter 3.2, where rmax = 1/Nb or in this case, 1/22 channels = 4.55%. 
Jamming Sweeping Frequency Average Probability of Intercept 
100 kHz 4.60% 
200 kHz 4.55% 
300 kHz 4.60% 
400 kHz 4.40% 
500 kHz 4.40% 
600 kHz 4.53% 
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Jamming Sweeping Frequency Average Probability of Intercept 
700 kHz 4.64% 
800 kHz 4.59% 
900 kHz 4.53% 
1 MHz 4.42% 
Table 1. POI Rates Calculated from Experiment 
The experiment showed the highest probability of intercept occurred at a sweeping 
frequency of 700 kHz. This does not necessarily mean the optimal sweeping frequency is 
700 kHz. The spectrogram signal in Figure 22 was further analyzed to find the maximum 
values for both waveforms. In Figure 26, the jammer’s signal has a +/- 3 MHz bandwidth 
represented with a green line. Any data points contained on or within these boundary 
limits, which overlapped the hopping frequency, were considered hits, and any data points 
outside these boundaries were counted as misses. 
 




Figure 27 shows there will be a longer overlapping duration, leading to a higher hit 
rate when the drone’s signal was hopping at either end of the jammer’s sweeping 
frequency. Figure 27 is a plot where the drone’s transmitter signal was close to the 
jammer’s lower frequency limit. 
 
Figure 27. Spectrogram MATLAB Plot of Drone Transmitter (Blue) and VCO 
(Red) at Higher Hit Rate 
 
A closer look at Figures 28 and 29, respectively, show how the hit rate differed 
drastically depending on the hopping frequency for the RC drone transmitter. 
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Figure 28. Closer Examination of the Hit Rate from Figure 22 
 
Figure 29. Closer Examination of the Hit Rate from Figure 23 
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Furthermore, Figures 30 and 31 demonstrate a hit and miss, respectively, between the 
jamming signal in red and the RC drone transmitter signal blue. 
 
Figure 30. Spectrogram MATLAB Plot of a Hit 
 
Figure 31. Spectrogram MATLAB Plot of a Miss 
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Similar to the MATLAB simulation in Chapter 3.4, the hit rate was calculated where 
the absolute value between the two signals was less than 3 MHz. Based upon the samples 
analyzed during the experiment, the lowest hit rate was 7.79% and the highest hit rate 
was 25.10%. The following chart shows the average hit rates for 22 communications 
hopping frequencies at each of the 10 jamming sweeping frequencies: 
 
Jamming Sweeping Frequency 
 
Average Hit Rate 
100 kHz 12.72% 
200 kHz 12.32% 
300 kHz 12.74% 
400 kHz 12.19% 
500 kHz 12.20% 
600 kHz 12.38% 
700 kHz 12.66% 
800 kHz 12.36% 
900 kHz 12.09% 
1 MHz 11.92% 
Table 2. Hit Rates Calculated from Experiment 
The experimental results showed a small deviation in the hit rate as the jamming 
sweeping frequency was increased from 100 kHz to 1 MHz. The sweeping frequencies 
appeared to show a general decrease in hit rate as the sweeping frequency increased. 
According to the experiment, the optimal sweeping frequency was 100 kHz, as this 
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yielded the highest hit rate and required the least amount of energy to produce the 
waveform. 
 
Figure 32. Experimental Hit Rate Illustrates a General Decreasing Trend (Red 
Line) as the Sweeping Frequency Increases 
 




Figure 33. MATLAB Simulation With 22 Frequency Hopping Channels 
When the prototype DDMR was tested in the anechoic chamber, there were two 
frequencies ranges that did not effectively jam the RC drone communications link: (1) 
sweeping frequencies below 100 kHz and (2) sweeping frequencies over 1.4 MHz. These 
experimental results allowed the research contained within this thesis to focus on the 100 
kHz to 1 MHz sweeping frequency range. 
The hit rates from the experimental results fall within the hit rate limits set forth in 
the theories explained in Chapters 3.2 and 3.3. One of the reasons these hit rates vary is 
explained with the 3 MHz boundary threshold. Changing this threshold yields different 
results – increasing the threshold would increase the hit rate while decreasing the 
threshold would decrease the hit rate. However, the most significant observation from the 
experiment was the hit rate variation based upon the location of the communications 
waveform within the ISM frequency band.  
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A potentially better approach to find an overall hit rate may be considered by 
modifying Saarnisaari’s hit rate. This could be done by calculating the hit rate following 
Saarinsaari’s method, and then further extrapolating the process over the non-repeating 
hopping channels. The final results would produce an equally weighted hit rate, and they 
would more accurately reflect the hit rate across the Nb channels. This thesis proposes an 
alternative method to calculating a new hit rate for a drone communications link using 
FHSS technology: 
 







The hit rate in jamming theory represents the portion of the communications signal 
adversely affected by the jamming power. It indicates the average portion of time where 
the communications hopping frequency and the jamming frequency are overlapping. In 
terms of the bit-error rate (BER), the common equation [23, 24] is: 
 
	𝑃pK = (1 − 𝜌)𝑃K .
𝐸K
𝑁"





Where 𝐸K  is the symbol energy, 𝑁" is the receiver channel noise power, and 𝑁' is jamming 
noise power. The precise BER required to disable the communications link for any 
commercial drone will be manufacture specific. To protect the integrity of its products, 
this information is not made publicly available by drone manufacturers. Based on the 
experimental results for both the POI and hit rates as previously cited, the optimal 





Chapter 4: System Implementation and Design Considerations 
4.1 Overall ECM System Design 
There are only a few companies who manufacture and sell portable drone jamming 
systems. While these systems are prohibited for sale and use in the United States, the 
federal government and military can utilize these products outside the United States. An 
effective ECM system must be versatile and adjust to any radio frequency band on which 
the drone is operating. This system can be very challenging to create because if the 
jammer covers more frequency bands it will have greater power requirements. This 
requires the ECM system to be larger in size, heavy, and possibly less portable. For 
instance, the following portable jamming system is a versatile system that will jam the 
2.4 GHz, 5.8 GHz, GPS, and GLONASS frequency bands. The jammer is larger than 
others and requires the use of a battery pack that must be attached to the jammer to 
operate. 
 
Figure 34. DroneShield DroneGun [28] 
The prototype DDMR system was effective at disabling the RC drone’s transmitting 
link in chamber experiments with the assistance of a wave function generator. This is not 
a practical design outside of a controlled laboratory due to its size and power 
requirements. This thesis focused on an improved, portable DDMR system which could 
46 
be implemented outside of the lab. In order to achieve these goals, the system was 
developed to jam the most common commercial drone communications frequency, the 
2.4 GHz band. The DDMR system sacrificed versatility for power, size, and weight. 
Once the optimal sweeping frequency was determined for the DDMR’s VCO, other 
important considerations were the antenna selection and power output, or effective range, 
of the jamming system. There are two general types of antennas used for jammers: 
parabolic reflective antennas and dipole antennas. Both of these antennas have specific 
features. “A parabolic antenna is an antenna that uses a parabolic reflector, a curved 
surface with the cross-sectional shape of a parabola, to direct the radio waves.” [29] The 
dipole antenna essentially consists of two conductive elements that are provided with a 
signal. “The driving current from the transmitter is, or for receiving antennas the output 
signal to the receiver is taken, between the two halves of the antenna.” [30] A yagi antenna 
is a common dipole antenna that is the ideal antenna design for any jamming system. 
4.2 Impact of Antenna Design and Multipath Issues 
The TY-24-17-20 yagi antenna was selected for the prototype DDMR due to its 
narrow beamwidth and frequency range of 2.4 GHz to 2.48 GHz. This antenna was 
matched to the design specification of the VCO. The yagi antenna has a gain of 17 dBi 
and the following characteristics: 
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Figure 35. Yagi Antenna Characteristics [32] 
 
Figure 36. Yagi Antenna Beamwidth Polarization [32] 
48 
When an RC drone’s transmitter signal is propagated towards the drone’s receiver, 
the signal will expand the further it travels. The same is true for the DDMR’s VCO output 
signal. If there are obstacles, such as buildings or possible geographical barriers present, 
the signals are likely going to be reflected, refracted, or somehow interfered with making 
duplicate waveforms. When there are multiple waveforms present, due to the RF signals 
taking various paths from the transmitter to the receiver, then multipath propagation 
occurred. Multipath distortion presents a larger issue for the communications link 
between the drone’s transmitter and receiver. When jamming a drone’s communications 
link, any multipath distortion that may manifest from the DDMR’s VCO signal, for 
instance a large building, will not be significant to its overall effectiveness. By design, 
the DDMR is trying to corrupt and interfere with the drone’s communications link. 
4.3 Hardware Design 
There are several factors to consider when designing the hardware for the DDMR 
system to make the system small, lightweight, and effective. The particular VCO selected 




-55°C                         -25°C                         -85°C 
5.50 2415.8 2404.3 2394.4 
6.00 2433.0 2421.7 2411.9 
6.50 2450.3 2438.7 2428.7 
7.00 2466.7 2455.2 2445.1 
7.50 2482.9 2471.5 2461.0 
8.00 2498.8 2487.1 2476.7 
8.50 2513.8 2501.2 2491.8 
Table 3. ZX95-2490+ Performance Data [33] 
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The input voltage of the sine wave supplying the VCO will vary between 5.5 volts 
and 8.5 volts to ensure the output sweeping frequency is adequately covering the 2.4 GHz 
band. 
A spectrum analyzer was used to measure the effectiveness of the DDMR’s VCO. 
Screenshots were captured for 1 MHz, 500 kHz, and 100 kHz. It should be noted that a 
42 dBm attenuator was placed on the output signal of the VCO into the spectrum analyzer 
for the measurements. The following figures demonstrate how the system covers the 2.4 
GHz frequency band: 
 
 
Figure 37. Jamming Sweeping Frequency at 1 MHz 
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Figure 38. Jamming Sweeping Frequency at 500 kHz 
 
Figure 39. Jamming Sweeping Frequency at 100 kHz 
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The above figures further demonstrate how increasing the jamming sweeping 
frequency also requires significantly more energy to sufficiently jam the entire ISM band. 
A jamming sweeping frequency of 1 MHz required approximately twice the energy of a 
jamming sweeping frequency at 100 kHz. 
The Arduino Uno was first studied for use as the microcontroller to control the 
sinusoidal waveform. The 16 MHz Arduino UNO microcontroller and an operation 
amplifier design were created to replace the waveform function generator used 
successfully in previous experimentation. The Arduino UNO output a pulse width 
modulated (PWM) signal through a high pass filter to create the desired sinusoidal 
waveform. 
 
Figure 40. Arduino UNO Hardware Design with High Pass Filter 
It was quickly realized, through minor changes to the software code, the sweeping 
frequency was significantly limited with this particular microcontroller. The fastest 
frequency the microcontroller could produce was approximately 1.175 kHz. The 
following screenshots show two different sweeping frequencies: 
52 
 
Figure 41. Arduino UNO Sine Wave at 7 Hz 
 
Figure 42. Arduino UNO Sine Wave at 1.175 kHz 
An alternative option to the Arduino UNO was the Arduino DUE which has a much 
faster CPU with an 84 MHz clock. With this microcontroller, there was no need for a high 
pass filter to produce a sine wave. 
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Figure 43. Arduino DUE Hardware Design 
This hardware design also faced similar issues, as the sine wave could not be 
generated at a sufficient frequency. The analogWriteResolution function generated a 12-
bit waveform and increased the frequency to approximately 32kHz; however, the 
waveform resolution was very poor, as shown below. 
 
Figure 44. Arduino DUE Sine Wave at 32.45 kHz 
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After several unsuccessful attempts to use an Arduino microcontroller to generate the 
sine wave and oscillate it at sufficient frequency, a board from Red Pitaya was selected 
due to its versatility. This particular platform was considered, as it could potentially 
replace a waveform function generator, microcontroller, and voltage-controlled oscillator 
(VCO) all in one design. 
 
Figure 45. Red Pitaya 
However, the Red Pitaya hardware is much more expensive than using an Arduino 
microcontroller, op amp, and VCO. The Red Pitaya board was very user friendly but 
suffered problems similar to the Arduino microcontrollers. The following sequential 
screenshots illustrate the sweeping frequency with a 5 MHz step size through its VCO: 
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Figure 46. Red Pitaya Step 1  Figure 47. Red Pitaya Step 2 
 
Figure 48. Red Pitaya Step 3 
It took several seconds for the hardware to incrementally step through the entire 2.4 
GHz to 2.5 GHz frequency range. While this hardware design swept the entire 2.4 GHz 
band, it did so at such a slow speed that it never effectively jammed the hopping frequency 
of the drone’s communications link. This hardware design performed inferior to the 
Arduino microcontrollers. 
The Arduino UNO microcontroller design was considered again, but with assistance 
from the AD9850 DDS (direct digital synthesizer). The DDS was added to the 
microcontroller system to regulate the sweeping frequency. The Arduino UNO was used 
to output a sine wave signal to the DDS, which then oscillated the waveform to the desired 
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frequency. The sweeping frequency was easily modified through Arduino’s open source 
software code [34]. 
 
Figure 49. Arduino UNO with AD9850 DDS 
 
Figure 50. Sine Wave Sweeping at 100 kHz 
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Figure 51. Sine Wave Sweeping at 1 MHz 
The output voltage of the jamming sweeping frequency from the Arduino UNO with 
the AD9850 DDS was not within the specifications for the VCO to effectively jam the 
ISM band. Again, from the experimental results discussed in Chapter 3.5, the optimal 
jamming sweeping frequency was approximately 300 kHz. After the optimal sweeping 
frequency was determined, the resistor values were calculated for the non-inverting 
operational amplifier. The op-amp was needed to amplify the output waveform from the 
Arduino UNO as the signal oscillated between 5.5 V and 8.5 V. The amplified waveform 






Chapter 5: DDMR Concept of Operations 
5.1 DDMR Low Cost Solution 
The DDMR system is an alternative option to other ECMs on the market, and it has 
the advantage of being a low cost and portable solution to effectively jam sUAS and 
drones that operate on the 2.4 GHz, ISM carrier frequency. Previous anechoic chamber 
testing determined the optimal jamming sweeping frequency was within the 100 kHz to 
1 MHz frequency range. Theoretical studies helped identify the boundary limits for the 
POI and hit rates. MATLAB simulations and experimental results yielded the optimal 
jamming sweeping frequency of 300 kHz, which was critical to the hardware design of 
the DDMR jamming system. 
The hardware for the new DDMR system is contained within the small gray box in 
Figure 49. The system is powered by a 15 V DC power supply. 
 
Figure 52. DDMR System 
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The size, weight, and low cost of the DDMR make it a viable resource for 
organizations who protect critical infrastructures and venues. The hardware designed for 
the new DDMR may be further refined to achieve a smaller scale, thus allowing it to be 
added to existing equipment, such as an assault rifle style platform, for quick and easy 
deployment.  With the addition of an optical (reticle) aiming system, an AR or other 
similar platform would allow the user to accurately aim the antennae at a sUAS or drone. 
 
Figure 53. Inside the DDMR 
The total cost for all of the parts used in the jamming component of the new DDMR 
system are less than $150. In comparison, the prototype DDMR system’s wave function 
generator, with no other hardware components considered, far outweighed the cost of this 
new system. In addition, the prototype DDMR system was not portable due to the wave 
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function generator’s size and power requirements. The original parabolic reflective 
antenna was also very large and bulky when compared to the new Yagi antenna design. 
5.2 Summary and Future Work 
One important limitation of this research is the new DDMR system was unable to be 
evaluated in an outdoor, real-world environment. This was primarily due to the federal 
laws which prohibit active jamming within the United States, as stated in Chapter 1.2. 
Since the jammer had the possibility to potentially interfere with other nearby 
communications signals operating on the 2.4 GHz carrier band, approval from the FCC 
would have been required. It would have taken a significant amount of time for the FCC 
to review and approve a proposal. As such, it was not possible to complete experimental 
hardware testing within the timeframe of this thesis, but the testing should be completed 
in the future. Obtaining FCC approval would be particularly helpful, as it would further 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the DDMR system in a real-world environment. 
The new DDMR system was designed only to jam the communications link on the 
ISM band. Future research could be expanded to other common carrier bands, such as the 
4.8 GHz band, since drone enthusiasts often modify their drones to operate at other carrier 
frequencies. As GPS has become commonplace, it must be expected drone users will 
begin to utilize this technology as well. In particular, as the other designated frequency 
bands become more crowded with emerging electronic devices (smart cars, smart homes, 
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Appendix A: Open Source Arduino Code 





void setup()  
{ 
  analogWriteResolution(12);  //12 bit very poor resolution; 8 bit better resolution 
} 
 




i = i+1;   
value = i*10;      //i*10; freq control *1=680Hz; *10=6kHz; *20=12kHz; 
if(value>4096)   // 12 bit 4096 very poor resolution at 32kHz; and 8 bit 256 only 3kHz 
{ 
  //i=0; 




















void setup()  
{ 
  analogWriteResolution(12);  //12 bit very poor resolution; 8 bit better resolution 
} 
 




i = i+1;   
value = i*10; //i*10; freq control *1=680Hz; *10=6kHz; *20=12kHz; 
if(value>4096)  // 12 bit 4096 very poor resolution at 32kHz; and 8 bit 256 only 3kHz 
{ 
  //i=0; 
















Arduino UNO code with AD9850 [20] 
 
/*  
 * A simple single freq AD9850 Arduino test script 
 * Original AD9851 DDS sketch by Andrew Smallbone at www.rocketnumbernine.com 
 * Modified for testing the inexpensive AD9850 ebay DDS modules 
 * Pictures and pinouts at nr8o.dhlpilotcentral.com 
 * 9850 datasheet at http://www.analog.com/static/imported-
files/data_sheets/AD9850.pdf 
 * Use freely 
 */ 
  
#define W_CLK 8       // Pin 8 - connect to AD9850 module word load clock pin (CLK) 
#define FQ_UD 9       // Pin 9 - connect to freq update pin (FQ) 
#define DATA 10       // Pin 10 - connect to serial data load pin (DATA) 
#define RESET 11      // Pin 11 - connect to reset pin (RST). 
  
#define pulseHigh(pin) {digitalWrite(pin, HIGH); digitalWrite(pin, LOW); } 
  
 // transfers a byte, a bit at a time, LSB first to the 9850 via serial DATA line 
void tfr_byte(byte data) 
{ 
  for (int i=0; i<8; i++, data>>=1) { 
    digitalWrite(DATA, data & 0x01); 
    pulseHigh(W_CLK);   //after each bit sent, CLK is pulsed high 
  } 
} 
 
 // frequency calc from datasheet page 8 = <sys clock> * <frequency tuning word>/2^32 
void sendFrequency(double frequency) { 
  int32_t freq = frequency * (4294967295)/125000000;  // note 125 MHz clock on 9850 
//.24 to send 1MHz output freq(old chip) 
   
  for (int b=0; b<4; b++, freq>>=8) { 
    tfr_byte(freq & 0xFF); 
  } 
  tfr_byte(0x000);   // Final control byte, all 0 for 9850 chip 
  pulseHigh(FQ_UD);  // Done!  Should see output 
} 
 
void setup() { 
 // configure arduino data pins for output 
  pinMode(FQ_UD, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(W_CLK, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(DATA, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(RESET, OUTPUT); 
67 
    
  pulseHigh(RESET); 
  pulseHigh(W_CLK); 
  pulseHigh(FQ_UD);  // this pulse enables serial mode - Datasheet page 12 figure 10 
} 
 
void loop() { 
  sendFrequency(1000000);  //control output freq 
  delay (1000); 
  //sendFrequency(10.01e6);  // freq 




















Appendix B: MATLAB Simulation Code 
%VCO 5.5V = ~2.4GHz and 8.5V = ~2.5GHz 
%For sine wave sweeping frequency: 




%Sample size at 1MHz or 1 uSec for jamming frequency 
SS = 100; 
  
%Dwell time of 100 milli-seconds 
%uSec -> each step is 10 uSec => 1 millisecond times one thousand uSec times SS 
DT = 100 * 1000 * SS;  %DT is 100ms 
  
%random integers for 8 channels in first array and random frequency for 8 
%frequencies between 2.4GHz to 2.5GHz in second array 
DFT = sortrows([randperm(8)' (2.400: 0.090/7: 2.490)']);                                                    
%plot(DFT(:,2), ':') 
%Sweeping frequency 0.1=>100Khz 1=>1MHz 
%If increase sweeping frequency need to increase the below sample rate 
SFreq = 0.100: 0.100: 1.000; 
  
%1,000,000 samples in 1 micro-second length 
for j = 1:length(SFreq) 
    for i = 1:(SS*1e6*2.5) 
%Phantom frequency and creating a Phantom frequency table     
%Repeats the hopping frequency table 1,000,000 samples divided by 8 (array 
%size) 
%mod(i/DT,8)+1 bc the array cannot equal zero --> making array table 1 thru 
%8 
    DFreq(i) = DFT(floor(mod(i/DT,8)+1),2); 
%Jamming frequency 
    JFreq(i) = sin((i*(2*pi))/SS*SFreq(j))*(.100/2)+2.450; 
    end 
    %Abs value between Phantom frequency and Jamming frequency for less 
    %than 3 MHz bandwidth increments 
    %Hit rate is calculated by taking the absolute value between 
    %both arrays for less than 3 MHz (FHSS bandwidth is 1 MHz) 
    %Length will give a final count of positive hits 
    X = find(abs(JFreq-DFreq) < 0.003); 
    %Counter 
    x = 1; 
    l = 0; 
    %Create large array X and count each incremental (small x) within array 
    %If length exceeds array X increase count and move to next array X and 
69 
    %continue counting hits 
    for k = 1:length(X) 
        if X(k)-x > SS 
            x = X(k); 
            l = l+1; 
        end 
    end 
    %Jamming rate is total counted hits above and divided by the length of 
    %Phantom frequency divided by the sample size 
















ylabel('Hit Rate %','FontSize',14,'FontWeight','bold') 
xlabel('Sweeping Frequency (kHz)','FontSize',14,'FontWeight','bold') 
set(gca,'XTickLabel',[100: 100: 1000]) 
axis([-inf,inf,0,20]) 
grid on; 















RC = textread('RC Freq3/RC Freq025.txt'); 
x = RC(:,1); 
VCO = textread('VCO/1 MHz Jamming.txt'); 
y = VCO(:,1); 
  










title('Jammer Input Signal','FontSize',14,'FontWeight','bold') 
  
%FFT 
nfft = 131072;  %2^17 less than D=200k 
RCfft = fftshift(fft(x,nfft)); 
VCOfft = fftshift(fft(y,nfft)); 
fs = 20e9; %sampling frequency 20GSa/s from scope with 10us sample period 
n = fs*(-nfft/2:nfft/2-1)/nfft;  %DFT sample points 
figure(3) 
hold on 







title('RC Transmitter Versus VCO FFT','FontSize',16,'FontWeight','bold') 
  
%PSD 
X = fft(x,nfft); 
X = X(1:nfft/2+1); 
Px = X.*conj(X)/(nfft*nfft); %complex and real numbers 
Y = fft(y,nfft); 
Y = Y(1:nfft/2+1); 
Py = Y.*conj(Y)/(nfft*nfft); 
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title('RC Transmitter Versus VCO Power Spectral 





[s1,f1,t1,p1] = spectrogram(x,5000,4800,4000,fs); 
surf(t1,f1,10*log10(abs(p1)),'EdgeColor','b'); 

















[q_RC,nd_RC] = max(10*log10(p1)); 














title('Spectrogram 1 MHz Sweeping Frequency','FontSize',16,'FontWeight','bold') 
J = length(find(abs((f(nd_VCO)-(f(nd_RC)))) <= 3e5)); 
HR = (J/length(f(nd_RC))) 
  
%Peak RC frequency 
[A,B] = max(10*log10(Px)); 
RC_Freq_Peak = f(1,B) 
